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Search Frictions, Labor Supply, and the Asymmetric Business Cycle^{*}

Domenico FerraroGiuseppe FioriArizona State UniversityFederal Reserve Board

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Abstract

We develop a business cycle model with search frictions in the labor market and a labor supply decision along the extensive margin that yields cyclical asymmetry between peaks and troughs of the unemployment rate and symmetric fluctuations of the labor force participation rate as in the U.S. data. We calibrate the model and find that cyclical changes in the extent of search frictions are solely responsible for the peak-trough asymmetry. Participation decisions do not generate asymmetry but contribute to the fluctuations in search frictions by changing the size and composition of the pool of job seekers, which in turn affects the tightness ratio and thereby slack in the labor market. The participation rate would be counterfactually asymmetric absent labor supply responses to shocks.

JEL Classification: E24; E32; J63; J64.

Keywords: Asymmetric business cycles; Labor supply; Search frictions; Employment; Unemployment rate; Labor force participation rate.

^{*}Ferraro: Department of Economics, W.P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, PO Box 879801, Tempe, AZ 85287, United States (email: domenico.ferraro@asu.edu); Fiori: Federal Reserve Board, Division of International Finance, 20th and C Sts., NW, Washington, DC 20551, United States (email: giuseppe.fiori@frb.gov). First version: February 12, 2018. We thank Steven Davis, Maximiliano Dvorkin, Nezih Guner, Kyle Herkenhoff, Cosmin Ilut, Loukas Karabarbounis, Kurt Mitman, Toshihiko Mukoyama, Pietro Peretto, José-Víctor Ríos-Rull, Richard Rogerson, Raül Santaeulàlia-Llopis, Todd Schoellman, Henry Siu, Nora Traum, Venky Venkateswaren, Ludo Visschers, Yaniv Yedid-Levi, and several conference and seminar audiences for helpful comments and suggestions.

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1 Introduction

In the United States, cyclical fluctuations in the employment-to-population ratio display a striking asymmetry: deviations below trend ("troughs") are larger than deviations above trend ("peaks"). This asymmetry between peaks and troughs produces significant higher-order moments, such as negative skewness in the distribution of the employment-to-population ratio in deviations from trend. Sichel (1993) first refers to this phenomenon as "deepness," which since then has become one of the stylized facts of the U.S. business cycle (McKay and Reis, 2008).

The large and growing literature on the topic studies this phenomenon through the lens of a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) model in which search frictions generate unemployment (Diamond, 1982; Mortensen, 1982; Pissarides, 1985). This approach uses a two-state representation of the labor market, which abstracts from participation decisions altogether (Andolfatto, 1997; Abbritti and Fahr, 2013; Dupraz, Nakamura and Steinsson, 2020; Ferraro, 2017, 2018; Hairault, Langot and Osotimehin, 2010; Petrosky-Nadeau and Zhang, 2013, 2017; Pizzinelli, Theodoridis and Zanetti, 2020).

In contrast, labor force participation decisions take center stage in this paper. We begin with documenting a new, overlooked fact: cyclical fluctuations in the labor force participation rate are symmetric around the trend, implying that deepness in the U.S. employment-to-population ratio is accounted for solely by the unemployment rate. Given these observations, one might conclude that participation decisions, and thus worker flows in and out of the labor force, are inconsequential for the study of cyclical asymmetry.

There are, however, at least two reasons to be skeptical about this view; one is empirical, and the other is theoretical. First, worker flows in and out of the labor force account for around one-third of the cyclical volatility in the unemployment rate (Elsby, Hobijn and Şahin, 2015). Also, transition probabilities from nonparticipation to unemployment and from unemployment to nonparticipation are countercyclical and pro-cyclical, respectively. Thus, during recessions, a larger share of individuals who would have left the labor force remains unemployed, and a larger share of nonparticipants who would have stayed out of the labor force enters the unemployment pool. These patterns exacerbate congestion in the labor market during recessions, contributing to generating deepness.

Second, in the context of a DMP model extended to allow for an active participation margin, the lack of cyclical asymmetry in the participation rate is somewhat puzzling. In a three-state model, an important object impinging on the decision to enter the labor force is the probability of finding a job. In the data, cyclical fluctuations in such probability display significant deepness (Ferraro, 2018). Thus, a model that successfully reproduces deepness in the probability of finding a job would naturally generate a sharp fall in the individuals' willingness to enter the labor force during recessions. At the same time, such labor supply decisions change the size and the composition of the pool of job seekers competing for jobs, affecting vacancy posting and the extent of slack in the labor market.

To quantify these mechanisms, we develop a business cycle model that reconciles the asymmetry in the unemployment rate with the symmetric fluctuations in the labor force participation rate. The model combines search frictions with vacancy posting, as in the DMP model, with a labor supply decision with indivisible labor, as in Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988). In the model, workers are heterogeneous in home productivity, which changes over time because of persistent idiosyncratic shocks. Aggregate market productivity shocks generate business cycles.

The model embodies two propagation mechanisms of productivity shocks: (i) shifts in the individuals' willingness to work and (ii) fluctuations in the extent of frictions, i.e., the speed at which job seekers meet employers posting vacancies, which depends on market tightness (the ratio of vacancies to job seekers). Unlike in the DMP model, in our setting, the market tightness ratio is determined in equilibrium by posted job vacancies (labor demand) jointly with participation decisions (*desired* labor supply). Actual and desired labor supply differ because of search frictions.

First, a separation and a search cutoff on home productivity determine whether an individual is out of, attached, or not attached to the labor force. An individual attached to the labor force is either employed or unemployed and searching for a job, whereas a non-attached individual participates insofar as he or she is employed. The response of the two cutoffs to productivity shocks, keeping the tightness ratio and so the level of frictions fixed, is what we refer to as the *"labor supply channel,"* which captures the endogenous, yet partial equilibrium, adjustment of individual labor supply to productivity shocks.

Second, the market tightness ratio falls in response to a negative productivity shock, generating slack in the labor market. We refer to this mechanism as the "*slackness channel*," which captures the equilibrium feedback effect between vacancy posting and individuals' participation decisions. Notably, equilibrium vacancies are determined based on the size and composition of the pool of job seekers: the participation margin directly contributes to the cyclical movements in labor market frictions. This channel is absent in the DMP model, where all individuals are participants at all times.

We calibrate the model to U.S. data and find that it accounts reasonably well for the deepness of the unemployment rate and the lack thereof in the participation rate. In addition, the model captures salient features of the cyclical movements in gross worker flows, a well-known challenge for existing three-state models of the labor market (see, e.g., Shimer, 2013; Tripier, 2004; Veracierto, 2008).

To study the role of labor supply vis-à-vis search frictions, we propose a structural quantitative accounting exercise. Specifically, we generate two counterfactual time series for the unemployment rate and the labor force participation rate, keeping the same realization of productivity shocks. In the first counterfactual, we drop the indifference conditions determining the separation and search cutoffs, fix the two cutoffs on home productivity at their steady-state values, and let the tightness ratio vary in response to shocks as implied by the free-entry condition. In the second counterfactual, we drop the free-entry condition instead, fix the tightness ratio at its steady-state value, and let the cutoffs vary.¹

We find that the slackness channel— and so fluctuations in the extent of frictions is the key driving force of deepness in the employment rate, and that the participation margin per se does not generate cyclical asymmetry. In the model, the matching process between job seekers and vacancies is subject to congestion due to random search, implying that the probability that a job-seeker meets an employer falls more in response to adverse shocks than it rises in response to positive shocks. In other words, if the labor supply channel were the only driving force of fluctuations, we would observe symmetric fluctuations in employment, as in the frictionless real business cycle (RBC) model. To be sure, this is not to say that the labor force participation margin is inconsequential for cyclical asymmetry. On the contrary, in a three-state model like ours, individuals' flows in and out of the labor force depend on market tightness, and they all contribute to the stocks of employment, unemployment, and nonparticipation- and so the mass of job seekers competing for jobs. During recessions, in the model, as in the data, unemployed individuals are less likely to drop out of the labor force, and individuals out of the labor force are more likely to enter the labor force as unemployed. Accounting for the cyclicality of these gross worker flows is critical for the model to generate the cyclical volatility and asymmetry in the data.

¹Such a decomposition cannot be implemented solely with data on labor market stocks and average transition probabilities as in, say, Elsby, Hobijn and Şahin (2015). The reason is that observed transition probabilities are equilibrium objects jointly determined by the individuals' willingness to work for a given level of market tightness and the probability of finding a job, which in turn depends on the collection of individuals' participation decisions and job vacancies.

Furthermore, absent the labor supply channel, the labor force participation rate would be markedly asymmetric, mirroring the cyclical asymmetry in the probability of finding a job, which is at odds with the data. The lack of asymmetry in the participation rate is not hardwired into the model; rather, it is the result of equilibrium forces inherent to the joint determination of market tightness and the cutoffs on home productivity.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the related literature. Section 3 briefly presents the observations that motivate the paper. Section 4 presents the model. In Sections 5 and 6, we take the model to the data and study its quantitative properties. Finally, Section 7 concludes. Appendices A, B, and C contain data sources, derivations, and additional results.

2 Related Literature

This paper contributes to our understanding of business cycle asymmetry. In the RBC tradition, Hansen and Prescott (2005) explain the negative skewness in U.S. market hours worked (in deviations from trend) in the context of a neoclassical growth model with occasionally-binding capacity constraints. Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006) study asymmetry in output growth rates using an RBC model augmented with learning about technology shocks. At the end of a boom, agents have accurate estimates of the state of technology so that a negative productivity shock prompts abrupt actions, leading to a sharp fall in investment and hours. Jovanovic (2006) explains the negative skewness in output growth rates through adopting technologies of uncertain skill requirements. Quadratic costs in skill mismatch imply that a good match raises output by less than a bad match reduces it, such that output growth rates are negatively skewed. McKay and Reis (2008) show that a model with asymmetric adjustment costs in employment and a choice of when to scrap old technologies reconciles the brevity and violence of the contractions in employment with the nearly symmetric fluctuations in output. Ordonez (2013) singles out financial frictions as an explanation for the observation that cyclical asymmetry is more pronounced in countries with less developed financial systems.

Using a search-theoretic model, Andolfatto (1997) argues that asymmetric fluctuations in the job destruction rate can qualitatively account for the fast rises and slow declines in the U.S. unemployment rate. Petrosky-Nadeau and Zhang (2013) argue that a DMP model, calibrated to match the cyclical volatility in the unemployment rate, produces the asymmetry between peaks and troughs in the data. Building on this result, PetroskyNadeau and Zhang (2017) show that a first-order approximation of the DMP equilibrium dynamics neglects nonlinearities in the propagation of shocks. Ferraro (2018) develops a search-and-matching model with heterogeneous workers in skills that reconciles the cyclical asymmetry in the unemployment rate with the nearly symmetric fluctuations in output. Abbritti and Fahr (2013) and Dupraz, Nakamura and Steinsson (2020) study cyclical asymmetry in a DMP model with downward nominal wage rigidity. This body of work abstracts from participation decisions altogether.

Our work also relates to the literature that studies the aggregate implications of threestate models of the labor market. The bulk of this body of work considers steady-state outcomes only (Garibaldi and Wasmer, 2005; Krusell et al., 2008, 2010, 2011; Pries and Rogerson, 2009). However, a few papers have confronted these models with the cyclical properties of labor market outcomes, too (Cairó, Fujita and Morales-Jiménez, 2019; Shimer, 2013; Tripier, 2004; Veracierto, 2008). Only recently, Krusell et al. (2017) show that a model with idiosyncratic risk, incomplete markets, and labor market frictions can account for the cyclical volatility and co-movement of U.S. gross worker flows. In their setting, job-finding rates are *exogenous* stochastic processes. By contrast, in our setting, job-finding rates are endogenously determined as an equilibrium outcome, based on the individuals' participation decisions and the free-entry condition for vacancy posting. This equilibrium property is instrumental in quantifying the role of search frictions as the source of cyclical asymmetry.

Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we formulate and quantify a threestate model that accounts for the deepness asymmetry in the unemployment rate and the symmetric fluctuations in the labor force participation rate, alongside key features of gross worker flows. Second, we quantify the importance of labor supply vis-à-vis search frictions for the cyclical volatility and asymmetry in the employment-to-population ratio, a question that previous studies have not addressed.

3 Motivating Facts

In this section, we detail the empirical observations that motivate our work. Based on Sichel (1993), we measure cyclical asymmetry with the third standardized central mo-

ment, or *skewness*, of the cyclical component \hat{x}_t of the time series x_t :

skew
$$(\hat{x}_t) = \frac{\mathbb{E}\left[(\hat{x}_t - \mathbb{E}\left[\hat{x}_t\right])^3\right]}{\sigma_{\hat{x}}^3},$$

where \mathbb{E} denotes the mathematical expectation operator and $\sigma_{\hat{x}}$ the standard deviation of the cyclical component \hat{x}_t expressed in percent deviations from trend. As is customary in the literature, fluctuations at the business cycle frequency are identified as occurring between 2 and 32 quarters. Also, since there is no firm consensus on the filtering approach, we report skewness statistics based on two alternative bandpass methods due to Baxter and King (1999) and Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003), as well as the procedure in Hodrick and Prescott (1997). To test for asymmetry against the null hypothesis of symmetry, we use the test developed by Bai and Ng (2005).²

Table 1 reports skewness statistics, with associated *p*-values, for the U.S. employmentto-population ratio, the employment rate (one minus the unemployment rate), and the labor force participation rate in the postwar period 1948-2016. To interpret the results, we consider the following decomposition of the employment-to-population ratio:

$$\frac{\text{emp}}{\text{pop}} = \underbrace{\left(1 - \frac{\text{unemp}}{\text{emp+unemp}}\right)}_{\text{employment rate}} \times \underbrace{\left(\frac{\text{emp+unemp}}{\text{pop}}\right)}_{\text{participation rate}}$$

This decomposition shows that employment as a fraction of the working-age population equals the employment rate (fraction of employed workers in the labor force, one minus the unemployment rate) times the participation rate (fraction of the population in the labor force). Hence, in an accounting sense, cyclical asymmetry in the employment-topopulation ratio may result from the unemployment rate, the participation rate, or both.

The results in Table 1 establish that cyclical fluctuations in labor force participation are virtually symmetric, which leaves the unemployment rate as the key driving force of asymmetry in the employment-to-population ratio. Specifically, the cyclical component of the employment-to-population ratio displays significant negative skewness. Note that this negative skewness remains significant and of similar magnitude also in the pre-1980 period. Thus, cyclical asymmetry is not driven by the so-called jobless recoveries of the 1990s, the 2000s, or the Great Recession of 2007-2009; rather, it is a systematic feature of

²See Appendix A for details on data sources.

the U.S. labor market over the entire post-war period.

	Skewness			
	Baxter- King	Christiano- Fitzgerald	Hodrick- Prescott	
A. Sample period: 1948:Q1-2016:Q4				
Employment-to-population ratio	-0.44 (0.02)	-0.29 (0.08)	-0.32 (0.03)	
Employment rate	-0.85 (0.00)	-0.51 (0.00)	-0.70 (0.00)	
Participation rate	0.09 (0.38)	0.05 (0.44)	0.05 (0.38)	
B. Sample period: 1948:Q1-1980:Q4				
Employment-to-population ratio	-0.42 (0.03)	-0.34 (0.05)	-0.43 (0.02)	
Employment rate	-0.80 (0.00)	-0.62 (0.01)	-0.76 (0.00)	
Participation rate	0.12 (0.34)	0.03 (0.45)	-0.06 (0.41)	

Table 1: Skewness in the U.S. Labor Market

Notes: For Baxter-King and Christiano-Fitzgerald, we consider frequencies between 2 and 32 quarters. The order of the moving average for the Baxter-King filter is set to 8 quarters. The smoothing parameter for the Hodrick-Prescott filter is 1,600. Variables are expressed in log-deviations from trend. P-values (one-sided test) in parentheses.

To understand what are the mechanisms that shape the cyclical asymmetry in the U.S. unemployment rate and the lack thereof in the participation rate, we build a quantitative model that incorporates employment, unemployment, and nonparticipation and use it as a laboratory to carry out counterfactual analysis. We turn to these issues next.

4 Model

4.1 Environment

Time is discrete and continues forever, indexed by $t = 0, 1, 2, ..., \infty$. The economy is inhabited by two types of agents: individuals and employers. Both agents are infinitely lived, are risk neutral, and discount future values at the same rate $\beta \in (0, 1)$. The mass

of individuals is normalized to one. An individual is endowed with one unit of time that can be allocated to three uses: market work, job search, and nonmarket work (e.g., leisure and home production). Market work and job search are mutually exclusive activities. An employer is either matched with an individual and producing output or unmatched and posting job vacancies. The mass of employers is determined in free-entry equilibrium.

Preferences and budget constraints. We assume that an individual has linear utility over consumption, c_t , and maximizes $\mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t c_t$, subject to the following flow budget constraints: consumption is equal to the wage, $c_t = w_t$, if he or she is employed; consumption is equal to unemployment insurance (UI) benefits, $c_t = b$, if the individual is unemployed; and consumption is equal to home production, $c_t = y_t^h$, if he or she is a nonparticipant, where y_t^h depends on idiosyncratic home productivity, x_t , and aggregate market productivity, y_t , in a way that we make precise later.

Heterogeneity and home productivity. As in Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005), individuals are heterogeneous in home productivity, x_t .³ The value of x_t may change over time with probability λ . In that event, the new value x_{t+1} for the next period is drawn from a probability distribution function f(x), taken to be log normal with parameters μ_x and σ_x , and defined over the bounded support $x_t \in [x^{\min}, x^{\max}]$. With probability $1 - \lambda$, home productivity maintains its current value into the next period. Hence, at the individual level, home productivity is persistent. But conditional on a switch, its current value does not affect its next-period realization.⁴

Aggregate productivity shock. Production requires a match between one employer and one individual. When a job-seeker and an employer meet and agree to create a match (or, equivalently, a job), they produce output, y_t , which evolves stochastically over time according to a first-order autoregressive (AR(1)) process in logs: $\log(y_{t+1}) = (1 - \rho_y) \ln(\bar{y}) + \rho_y \log(y_t) + \sigma_y \epsilon_{t+1}$, where \bar{y} is the unconditional mean of output and $\epsilon_t \stackrel{iid}{\sim} \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$ are innovations to the (log) output of a job. The parameters ρ_y and σ_y control the persistence

³We extend the work of Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005) along two important dimensions. First, we amend their model to allow for worker flows from nonparticipation to employment, which are both large and highly volatile in the data (see Krusell et al., 2017). This modification implies that the composition of the pool of job seekers contributes to determining labor market tightness. Second, we focus on transition dynamics triggered by business cycle shocks, rather than just focusing on steady-state outcomes.

⁴Everything else being equal, persistence in home productivity as governed by λ allows the model to generate realistic persistence in the transition probabilities in and out of the labor force.

and volatility of the innovations, ϵ_t , respectively.⁵

Wage determination. As in Shimer (2004) and many others, we assume an ad hoc wage rule relating the wage to labor productivity: $w_t = \bar{w}y_t^{\eta}$, where \bar{w} is a constant and the parameter η governs the cyclical sensitivity of the wage to labor productivity. The benefit of this parsimonious specification is twofold. First, it considerably simplifies the solution of the model. As the firm's value of a job is independent of home productivity, only the share of unemployed and nonparticipant individuals (instead of the full cross-sectional distribution) is relevant for vacancy posting.⁶ Second, depending on the value of η , the wage rule accommodates different degrees of wage flexibility.

Meeting technology. The matching process between searchers and employers posting vacancies is subject to a search friction. We assume a constant-returns-to-scale meeting technology: $m_t = \chi s_t^{\varepsilon} v_t^{1-\varepsilon}$, where m_t denotes the number of meetings between searchers and vacancies and s_t and v_t are the mass of searchers and vacancies, respectively. The probability that a searcher meets a vacancy is $p(\theta_t) = \theta_t^{1-\varepsilon}$, where $\theta_t \equiv v_t/s_t$ is the market tightness ratio. Similarly, the probability that a vacancy meets a searcher is $q(\theta_t) = \theta_t^{-\varepsilon}$.

In our setting, unemployed individuals compete with a subset of nonparticipants for jobs. Unemployed individuals are classified as "active" searchers, collect UI benefits, and meet a vacancy with probability $p(\theta_t)$. Nonparticipants who are randomly drawn in the pool of "passive" searchers, enjoy home production, do not collect UI benefits, and meet a vacancy with probability $\phi p(\theta_t)$, where $\phi \in (0, 1)$ is an exogenous constant.⁷ The main advantage of having a notion of passive searchers in the model is that it allows for worker flows from nonparticipation to employment, that are both large and highly volatile over the business cycle (see Krusell et al., 2017).⁸ Note also that while ϕ is exogenous and

⁵Altuğ, Ashley and Patterson (1999) find no evidence for nonlinearity in total factor productivity using aggregate-level U.S. data. Ilut, Kehrig and Schneider (2017) confirm this finding in establishment-level data.

⁶With Nash bargaining, the value of a job would naturally depend on home productivity via the wage. The higher the value of home productivity, the higher the opportunity cost of employment, the higher the wage would have to be for a searcher to accept a job.

⁷Our classification of active searchers as unemployed and participants and of passive searchers as nonparticipants is consistent with the approach of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (see Jones and Riddell, 1999, for further discussion).

⁸We acknowledge that, in the data, some of the observed flows from nonparticipation to employment may be due to time aggregation. As labor market data are sampled at the monthly frequency, measured flows from nonparticipation to employment may be due to unmeasured flows from nonparticipation to unemployment and from unemployment to employment insofar as they occur within the month. Here, we follow Krusell et al. (2017) and introduce a constant exogenous probability of becoming a (passive) searcher. Nonetheless, the flows from nonparticipation to employment remain endogenous in the sense

constant, the decision of accepting a job offer upon meeting an employer, and the choice of whether to become an active searcher next period or to remain out of the labor force continue to be endogenous.

Timing of events. Within the period, events unfold as follows. At the beginning of the period, the aggregate (y_t) and idiosyncratic (x_t) states are realized. After these events, the period consists of two stages. In the first stage, separation, participation, and search decisions are made simultaneously. In the second stage, output is produced and wages are paid. In our setting, there is a distinction between (i) a meeting between a vacancy and a job seeker and (ii) the creation of a job. Only if profitable for both parties, a meeting is converted into a job. The model uses the "instantaneous hiring" view, in which new hires begin working right away rather than with a one-period delay. As discussed in Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger (2006), this timing describes the U.S. labor market flows at a quarterly frequency.

4.2 Individual Agents' Problems

We formulate the individual agents' problems in recursive form and write value functions at the production stage when idiosyncratic and aggregate states have been realized and the agents' current decisions of continuing, destroying, or creating a match have been made.

4.2.1 Individuals

At the beginning of each period, an employee decides whether to remain in the match and receive the wage or separate. Conditional on separating, the individual has the option to become either unemployed or a nonparticipant, thus dropping out of the labor force. Similarly, a non-employed individual has the choice to search for a job or stay out of the labor force. Again, conditional on being out of the labor force, an individual cannot meet a job vacancy unless he or she receives a random job offer. In that event, the individual chooses whether to accept the job offer or remain out of the labor force. All flows across the three labor market states are thus endogenous.

that the individuals optimally decide whether to accept a job, or remain out of the labor force, given the realizations of the state variables.

Attached employed. At the production stage, the value of employment depends on whether the individual is attached or non-attached to the labor force. Let (x_t^v, x_t^q) denote the search and separation cutoffs, respectively, whose determination we describe later. The value of employment for an individual *attached* to the labor force is

 $W_{t}^{a} = w_{t}$ (instantaneous return) + $\beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left\{ (1 - \delta) \left[1 - \lambda + \lambda F(x_{t+1}^{v}) \right] \right\} W_{t+1}^{a}$ (continuing as attached employed) + $\beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left\{ \delta \left[1 - \lambda + \lambda F(x_{t+1}^{v}) \right] p(\theta_{t+1}) \right\} W_{t+1}^{a}$ (restarting as attached employed)

$$+\beta\mathbb{E}_{t}\left\{\left[(1-\delta)\lambda+\delta\lambda\phi p(\theta_{t+1})\right]\int_{x_{t+1}^{v}}^{x_{t+1}^{u}}W_{t+1}^{na}(x)dF(x)\right\}$$

(continuing or re-starting as non-attached employed)

$$+\beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left\{ \delta \left[1 - \lambda + \lambda F(x_{t+1}^{v}) \right] \left(1 - p(\theta_{t+1}) \right) U_{t+1} \right\}$$
 (becoming unemployed)
$$+\beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left\{ \left[\delta \lambda (1 - \phi p(\theta_{t+1})) \right] \int_{x_{t+1}^{v}}^{x_{t+1}^{q}} H_{t+1}^{a}(x) dF(x) \right\}$$

(becoming an attached nonparticipant)

$$+\beta \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \lambda \int_{x_{t+1}^q}^{x^{\max}} H_{t+1}^{na}(x) dF(x) \right\}, \qquad \text{(becoming a non-attached nonparticipant)}$$

where $(W_t^{na}(x), U_t, H_t^a, H_t^{na})$ are the value of employment for an individual not attached to the labor force, the value of unemployment, and the values of nonparticipation for an attached and non-attached individual, respectively.

Non-attached employed. The value of employment for an individual *not attached* to the labor force is

$$W_t^{na}(x) = w_t$$

$$+\beta \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \left[(1-\delta)\lambda F(x_{t+1}^v) + \delta\lambda F(x_{t+1}^v) p(\theta_{t+1}) \right] W_{t+1}^a \right\}$$
(instantaneous return)

(continuing or restarting as attached employed)

+
$$\beta \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \left[(1-\delta)(1-\lambda) + \delta(1-\lambda)\phi p(\theta_{t+1}) \right] W_{t+1}^{na}(x) \right\}$$

(continuing or restarting as non-attached employed w/ same *x*)

$$+\beta \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \left[(1-\delta)\lambda + \delta \lambda \phi p(\theta_{t+1}) \right] \int_{x_{t+1}^v}^{x_{t+1}^q} W_{t+1}^{na}(x) f(x) dx \right\}$$

(continuing or restarting as non-attached employed w/ new *x*)

 $+ \beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left\{ \left[\delta \lambda F(x_{t+1}^{v}) \left(1 - p\left(\theta_{t+1}\right) \right) \right] U_{t+1} \right\}$ (becoming unemployed) + $\beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left\{ \left[\delta \lambda \left(1 - \phi p\left(\theta_{t+1}\right) \right) + \delta(1 - \lambda) \left(1 - \phi p\left(\theta_{t+1}\right) \right) \right] \int_{x_{t+1}^{v}}^{x_{t+1}^{q}} H_{t+1}^{a}(x) dF(x) \right\}$

(becoming an attached nonparticipant)

(becoming a non-attached nonparticipant)

$$+\beta \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \lambda \int_{x_{t+1}^q}^{x^{\max}} H_{t+1}^{na}(x) dF(x) \right\}.$$

Unemployed. The value of unemployment is

$$\begin{split} & \mathcal{U}_{t} = b & (\text{instantaneous return}) \\ & + \beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left\{ \left[1 - \lambda (1 - F(x_{t+1}^{v})) \right] p(\theta_{t+1}) W_{t+1}^{a} \right\} & (\text{starting as attached employed}) \\ & + \beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left\{ \lambda \phi p_{t+1} \int_{x_{t+1}^{v}}^{x_{t+1}^{q}} W_{t+1}^{na}(x) dF(x) \right\} & (\text{starting as non-attached employed}) \\ & + \beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left\{ \delta [1 - \lambda (1 - F(x_{t+1}^{v}))] (1 - p_{t+1}) U_{t+1} \right\} & (\text{continuing as unemployed}) \\ & + \beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left\{ \lambda (1 - \phi p_{t+1}) \int_{x_{t+1}^{v}}^{x_{t+1}^{q}} H_{t+1}^{a}(x) dF(x) \right\} & (\text{becoming an attached nonparticipant}) \\ & + \beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left\{ \lambda \int_{x_{t+1}^{q}}^{x_{max}} H_{t+1}^{na}(x) f(x) dx \right\}. \end{split}$$

Attached nonparticipant. The value of nonparticipation for an *attached* individual is

$$\begin{split} H_{t}^{a}(x) &= y_{t}^{h} & (\text{instantaneous return}) \\ &+ \beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left\{ \lambda F(x_{t+1}^{v}) p\left(\theta_{t+1}\right) W_{t+1}^{a} \right\} & (\text{becoming attached employed}) \\ &+ \beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left\{ (1 - \lambda) \phi p\left(\theta_{t+1}\right) W_{t+1}^{na}(x) \right\} & (\text{becoming non-attached employed } w / \text{ same } x) \\ &+ \beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left\{ \lambda \phi p\left(\theta_{t+1}\right) \int_{x_{t+1}^{v}}^{x_{t+1}^{q}} W_{t+1}^{na}(x) dF(x) \right\} & (\text{becoming non-attached employed } w / \text{ new } x) \\ &+ \beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left\{ \lambda F(x_{t+1}^{v}) \left(1 - p\left(\theta_{t+1}\right)\right) U_{t+1} \right\} & (\text{becoming unemployed}) \\ &+ \beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left\{ (1 - \lambda) \left(1 - \phi p\left(\theta_{t+1}\right)\right) H_{t+1}^{a}(x) \right\} & (\text{remaining an attached nonparticipant } w / \text{ same } x) \\ &+ \beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left\{ \lambda \left(1 - \phi p\left(\theta_{t+1}\right)\right) \int_{x_{t+1}^{v}}^{x_{t+1}^{q}} H_{t+1}^{a}(x) dF(x) \right\} \end{split}$$

(remaining an attached nonparticipant w/ new *x*)

$$+\beta \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \lambda \int_{x_{t+1}^q}^{x^{\max}} H_{t+1}^{na}(x) dF(x) \right\}, \qquad \text{(becoming a non-attached nonparticipant)}$$

where the home production technology is specified as $y_t^h = x_t y_t / \bar{y}$.

⁹We scale home production by \bar{y} so that, in the deterministic steady state of the model, $y_t^h = x_t$.

Non-attached nonparticipant. The value of nonparticipation for a *non-attached* individual is

$$\begin{split} H_t^{na}(x) &= y_t^h \qquad (\text{instantaneous return}) \\ &+ \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \lambda F(x_{t+1}^v) p\left(\theta_{t+1}\right) W_{t+1}^a \right\} \qquad (\text{becoming attached employed}) \\ &+ \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ (1 - \lambda) \phi p\left(\theta_{t+1}\right) W_{t+1}^{na}(x) \right\} \qquad (\text{becoming non-attached employed w/ same } x) \\ &+ \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \lambda \phi p\left(\theta_{t+1}\right) \int_{x_{t+1}^v}^{x_{t+1}^q} W_{t+1}^{na}(x) dF(x) \right\} \qquad (\text{becoming non-attached employed w/ new } x) \\ &+ \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \left[\lambda F(x_{t+1}^v)(1 - p\left(\theta_{t+1}\right)) \right] U_{t+1} \right\} \qquad (\text{becoming unemployed}) \\ &+ \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ (1 - \lambda)(1 - \phi p\left(\theta_{t+1}\right)) H_{t+1}^{na}(x) \right\} \qquad (\text{remaining a non-attached nonparticipant w/ same } x) \\ &+ \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \lambda (1 - \phi p\left(\theta_{t+1}\right)) \int_{x_{t+1}}^{x_{t+1}^v} H_{t+1}^a(x) dF(x) \right\} \end{split}$$

$$B\mathbb{E}_{t}\left\{\lambda(1-\phi p\left(\theta_{t+1}\right))\int_{x_{t+1}^{v}}H_{t+1}^{u}(x)dF(x)\right\}$$
(becoming on attack

(becoming an attached nonparticipant w / new x)

$$+\beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left\{ \lambda \int_{x_{t+1}^{q}}^{x^{\max}} H_{t+1}^{na}(x) dF(x) \right\}.$$
(remaining a non-attached nonparticipant w/ new *x*)

4.2.2 Employers

From the employer's perspective, the value of being in an employment relationship (value of a job, for short) is always positive. This fact implies that employers never initiate job destruction. As argued earlier, however, individuals initiate job destruction when the value of nonparticipation exceeds the value of employment.

Value of a job. At the production stage, the value of a job is

$$J_t = y_t - w_t + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[(1 - d_{t+1}) J_{t+1} + d_{t+1} V_{t+1} \right], \tag{1}$$

where the individual's decision of destroying the match is subsumed in the indicator

$$d_t = \begin{cases} \delta & \text{if } H_t < W_t \\ 1 & \text{if } H_t \ge W_t \end{cases}$$
(2)

where $\delta \in (0, 1)$ is an exogenous rate of job destruction.

Value of a vacancy. The value of a posted vacancy is

$$V_t = -k + q(\theta_t)\Omega_t J_t + (1 - q(\theta_t)) \mathbb{E}_t V_{t+1},$$
(3)

where *k* is the per-period unit cost of opening and maintaining a vacancy. In addition, Ω_t in (3) is an equilibrium object that captures "selection" into the pool of job searchers (akin to an inverse Mills ratio). It measures the share of searchers that accepts a job offer:

$$\Omega_t \equiv \frac{u_t + \phi n_t^a}{u_t + \phi (n_t^a + n_t^{na})},\tag{4}$$

where u_t is the stock of unemployed, n_t^a is the stock of nonparticipants attached to the labor force, and n_t^{na} is the stock of nonparticipants non-attached.¹⁰ Active and passive searchers (or unemployed and nonparticipant attached, respectively) accept job offers, while nonparticipant non-attached decline them. So, insofar as $\phi > 0$, variation in u_t , n_t^a , and n_t^{na} , induced by productivity shocks, leads to cyclical variation in Ω_t , which in turn affects vacancy posting and thereby market tightness.

Free-entry condition. As in Pissarides (1985) and many other studies after that, employers post job vacancies until it is profitable to do so, which yields that the cost of posting a vacancy equals its expected benefit at all times such that $V_t = 0$ for all realizations of the aggregate shock y_t . As a result, the market tightness ratio, θ_t , is determined according to a forward-looking equation:

$$\frac{k}{q(\theta_t)\Omega_t} = y_t - w_t + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\frac{k}{q(\theta_{t+1})\Omega_{t+1}} \left(1 - d_{t+1} \right) \right].$$
(5)

As in the standard DMP model, the probability that a vacancy is filled depends on the probability of meeting a searcher $q(\theta_t)$; however, unlike in DMP, in our setting the job-filling probability depends on the fraction of searchers who are willing to work and so accept a job offer as captured by Ω_t . Note that if $\phi = 0$, then $\Omega_t = 1$ at all times, which shuts down the composition channel altogether, nesting the standard free-entry condition in DMP models.

¹⁰All the stocks are computed at the beginning of the period after aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks have been realized but before offers are received and matches formed.

4.3 Equilibrium

The equilibrium of the model is characterized by the solution to the value functions for individuals, $(W_t^a, W_t^{na}(x), U_t, H_t^a(x), H_t^{na}(x))$, together with the free-entry condition (5), which yields the market tightness ratio, θ_t , separation and search cutoffs, (x_t^q, x_t^v) , and the labor market stocks, (u_t, n_t^a, n_t^{na}) . Unlike in the standard DMP model, one needs to solve for the individual decision rules and the market tightness ratio *jointly* with the stocks of unemployment and nonparticipation. This property obtains because vacancy posting depends on the stocks of unemployed and of attached and non-attached nonparticipants.

Separation and search cutoff. Since the value of nonparticipation is increasing in *x*, it is possible to determine two threshold values that uniquely identify the separation cutoff, x^q , and the search cutoff, $x^v \le x^q$.

An individual separates from a match when the value of nonparticipation exceeds the value of working. The indifference condition for separation,

$$W^{na}(x_t^q, y_t) = H^a(x_t^q, y_t) = H^{na}(x_t^q, y_t),$$
(6)

implicitly defines the cutoff value x_t^q . Intuitively, the worker compares the utility cost of market work with the benefit of market work, which equals the wage plus the expected discounted value of continuing the employment relationship. Given that the value of nonparticipation is increasing in x_t , job separation satisfies the reservation property. That is, there exists a unique separation cutoff, x_t^q , so that all matches with individuals whose value of nonmarket work is $x_t \ge x_t^q$ are endogenously destroyed. Hence, aggregate shocks induce job destruction.

The indifference condition for search,

$$U(x_t^v, y_t) = H(x_t^v, y_t),\tag{7}$$

implicitly defines the cutoff value x_t^v . The marginal individual weighs the utility cost of job search against the benefit of job search, which equals the UI benefits, *b*, plus the expected discounted value of entering an employment relationship.

Dynamics of labor market stocks. The stocks of employment (e_t), unemployment (u_t), and nonparticipation (n_t) evolve over time according to

$$\begin{bmatrix} e_{t+1} \\ u_{t+1} \\ n_{t+1} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} f_{t+1}^{ee} & f_{t+1}^{ue} & f_{t+1}^{ne} \\ f_{t+1}^{eu} & f_{t+1}^{uu} & f_{t+1}^{nu} \\ f_{t+1}^{en} & f_{t+1}^{un} & f_{t+1}^{nn} \end{bmatrix} \times \begin{bmatrix} e_t \\ u_t \\ n_t \end{bmatrix},$$
(8)

where f_t^{ij} denotes the individual's transition probability from the labor market state *i* to *j* at time *t*.¹¹

Employed individuals separate from employers either exogenously with probability δ , or endogenously with probability $1 - F(x_t^q)$. Thus, δ and the separation cutoff x_t^q jointly determine the workers' transition probability from employment to unemployment, f_t^{eu} ; the workers' transition probability from employment to nonparticipation, f_t^{en} ; and the probability of remaining employed, f_t^{ee} , with the restriction that $f_t^{eu} + f_t^{en} + f_t^{ee} = 1$.

Unemployed individuals meet a posted vacancy with probability $p(\theta_t)$. Time variation in $p(\theta_t)$, resulting from changes in the tightness ratio, θ_t , captures endogenous fluctuations in the degree of labor market frictions. So the meeting probability, $p(\theta_t)$, and the separation, x_t^q , and participation, x_t^v , cutoffs jointly determine the workers' transition probability from unemployment to employment, f_t^{ue} ; the workers' transition probability from unemployment to nonparticipation, f_t^{un} ; and the probability of remaining unemployed, f_t^{uu} , with the restriction that $f_t^{ue} + f_t^{un} + f_t^{uu} = 1$.

Finally, nonparticipant individuals meet a posted vacancy with probability $\phi p(\theta_t)$. So the meeting probability $\phi p(\theta_t)$, and the separation, x_t^q , and participation, x_t^v , cutoffs jointly determine the transition probabilities from nonparticipation to employment, f_t^{ne} ; the transition probabilities from nonparticipation to unemployment, f_t^{nu} ; and the probability of remaining a nonparticipant, f_t^{nn} , so that $f_t^{ne} + f_t^{nu} + f_t^{nn} = 1$.

4.4 **Basic Properties of the Model**

To provide insight into the main forces at play in the model, here we discuss some basic properties of the deterministic steady state of the model, where the productivity shock is $y = \bar{y}$ at all times and the stocks of employment, unemployment, and nonparticipation are constant.

¹¹See Appendix **B** for details on the calculation of the transition probabilities.

4.4.1 Search and Separation Cutoffs

Figure 1 shows the cross-sectional distribution of home productivity alongside search and separation cutoffs for a calibrated version of the model, which we later use for our quantitative analysis.




Figure 1: The figure shows the cross-sectional distribution of home productivity in the deterministic steady state of the model, where the productivity shock is $y = \bar{y}$. See Section 5 for details on the parametrization of the model.

The steady state features three regions. First, individuals whose home productivity (or, equivalently, value of leisure) exceeds the separation cutoff, x^q , are nonparticipants. Second, individuals with home productivity smaller than the search cutoff, x^v , are either employed or unemployed. These individuals are attached to the labor force. Third, for home productivity between the search and separation cutoffs, individuals are employed or nonparticipants; they are attached to the labor force.

4.4.2 Market Tightness

Size of the pool of job seekers. Participation decisions affect the *size* of the pool of job seekers in two ways. First, for a given pool of unemployed individuals, a fraction ϕ of nonparticipants is drawn into the pool of job seekers; these individuals are passive

searchers who congest the labor market, which reduces the probability that an unemployed individual seeking work finds a job. Given that a job seeker's meeting probability is concave in the tightness ratio, this congestion effect is relatively more important during recessions, when the incentives to post job vacancies are depressed. This channel becomes self-evident if one uses the definition of the market tightness ratio, which gives job vacancies as $v = \theta \times (u + \phi n)$, where $u + \phi n$ is the size of the pool of job seekers. Hence, cyclical fluctuations in the measure of nonparticipants directly affect congestion insofar as $\phi > 0$. In the calibrated model, as in the data, the participation rate is pro-cyclical, implying that *n* rises in recessions and falls in expansions, which exacerbates congestion.

Second, we emphasize that in the model, the pool of unemployed individuals is itself affected by participation decisions. This situation occurs because during recessions, in the model, as in the data, unemployed individuals tend to remain unemployed at a higher rate, and individuals out of the labor force are more likely to transition into unemployment. Overall, the effect of the flows from and to unemployment leans toward a higher congestion of the labor market during recessions. Everything else being equal, these two effects increase the probability that an employer posting vacancies meets a job seeker and depresses the probability that a job seeker finds a job.

Composition of the pool of job seekers. Participation decisions affect the *composition* of the pool of job seekers, too. To clarify this channel, using $\beta = 1/(1+r)$, where *r* is the real interest rate, in the deterministic steady state we rewrite the free-entry condition (5) as

$$\frac{k}{q(\theta)\Omega} = \frac{1+r}{r+\delta} \left(\bar{y} - \bar{w}\bar{y}^{\eta} \right), \tag{9}$$

where, again, $\Omega = (u + \phi n^a)/(u + \phi n)$ is the share of job seekers who are willing to work at the steady-state wage $w = \bar{w}\bar{y}^{\eta}$. Unlike in the DMP model, in our model, an active labor supply decision implies that individual participation decisions endogenously determine the composition of the pool of job seekers. Whether composition amplifies or dampens the fluctuations in the tightness ratio θ depends on the cyclicality of Ω . Notably, if Ω is pro-cyclical, fluctuations in θ are amplified; conversely, if Ω is countercyclical, fluctuations in θ are dampened. In the calibrated model, Ω is countercyclical, thus contributing to dampening fluctuations in market tightness. We note that the countercyclicality of Ω is not hardwired into the model; rather, it critically depends on getting the right comovement between unemployment and nonparticipation with output.

5 Parametrization

To parametrize the model, we exogenously set the values of a subset of parameters and jointly calibrate the remaining parameters using the method of moments. This calibration exercise involves solving the model's deterministic steady state and finding parameter values so that the model matches a set of targeted moments in actual data.

We are to assign values to 15 parameters related to frictions in the labor market (η , k, ϕ , \bar{w} , ε , δ , and χ), preferences (β), UI benefits (b), and idiosyncratic and aggregate stochastic processes (μ_x , σ_x , λ , \bar{y} , σ_y , and ρ_y). The length of a model period is set to one month, as crucial labor market targets are available at a monthly frequency, taken from Krusell et al. (2017). The sample period runs from 1978:M1 to 2012:M9. Table 2 summarizes the parametrization of the model.

5.1 Exogenously Set Parameters

We use standard values for the parameters β , η , b, ε , ρ_y , and σ_y based on commonly accepted values in the literature.

The time discount factor β is set to 0.997 so that the annual risk-free interest rate of our economy equals 4%, a standard value in the literature (see, e.g., Gomme, Ravikumar and Rupert, 2011; McGrattan and Prescott, 2003). We set the wage elasticity to labor productivity $\eta = 0.7$ to match microeconomic estimates of wage flexibility in Haefke, Sonntag and van Rens (2013). We set *b* to obtain a 50% replacement rate relative to the steady-state wage, a value consistent with the generosity of the unemployment benefits system in the United States. We set the elasticity of matches to job seekers in the meeting function, ε , to 0.6, the midpoint of the estimates in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2006).

Transitory shocks to the productivity of a job are the source of aggregate fluctuations. Importantly, we assume that the stochastic process for log productivity follows an AR(1) process, such that it exhibits symmetric fluctuations around its steady-state value, \bar{y} . We set the persistence of the log productivity, ρ_y , to be 0.975 and its conditional volatility, σ_y , to be 0.5% so that the model reproduces the cyclical properties of the quarterly series of labor productivity in the data. To be sure, other shocks may hit the economy at different times and with different intensities (see Ramey, 2016, for an overview). While our analysis can accommodate other real shocks, we target productivity shocks, as they have been the focus of much of the business cycle research.

5.2 Calibrated Parameters

The remaining parameters are calibrated to match targeted moments in U.S. data. While none of the parameters has a one-to-one relationship to a specific moment, it is instructive to describe the calibration as a few distinct steps.

Parameter	Description	Value	Comments			
A. Labor market frictions						
η	Wage fcn: elasticity	0.700	Haefke, Sonntag and van Rens (2013)			
ŵ	Wage fcn: scale	1.668	Method of moments			
ϵ	Meeting fcn: elasticity	0.600	Petrongolo and Pissarides (2006)			
χ	Meeting fcn: scale	0.231	Method of moments			
κ	Unit vacancy cost	0.105	Steady-state tightness			
ϕ	Prob. of passive searching	0.521	Method of moments			
δ	Exogenous separation rate	0.022	Method of moments			
β b	Time discount factor UI benefits	0.997 0.5 <i>w</i>	Real interest rate (4%) Replacement rate (50%)			
C. First-order autoregressive (AR(1)) productivity shock						
\bar{y}	AR(1): mean	1.715	Method of moments			
ρ_y	AR(1): persistence	0.975	Fit to AR(1), HP-filtered labor prod.			
σ_y	AR(1): volatility	0.005	Fit to AR(1), HP-filtered labor prod.			
D. Home productivity shock						
μ_x	Log-normal: scale	0	Normalization			
σ_x	Log-normal: shape	1	Method of moments			
λ	Arrival rate	0.032	Method of moments			

After the normalization of the steady-state value of the market tightness ratio, we jointly calibrate the following seven model objects using seven data moments: (1) the steady-state value of f^{eu} (0.014); (2) the steady-state value of f^{en} (0.014); (3) the steady-state value of $f^{n^{e}}$ (0.12); (4) the steady-state value of f^{ue} (0.23); (5) the steady-state labor force participation rate (66.8%); (6) the steady-state share of nonparticipant attached (8%); and (7) the elasticity of f^{ue} with respect to labor productivity (3.09).

As in Shimer (2005), the cost of posting a job vacancy, k, is set to 0.10 so that the market tightness ratio equals 1 in the deterministic steady state, in which $y = \bar{y}$. We then calibrate the arrival rate of the idiosyncratic shock, λ , the scale parameter of the meeting function,

 χ , the probability that a nonparticipant is drawn in the pool of job seekers, ϕ , and the exogenous separation rate, δ , so that the deterministic steady state of the model jointly reproduces: (i) the average transition probability from employment to nonparticipation, \bar{f}^{en} ; (ii) the average transition probability from unemployment to nonparticipation, \bar{f}^{un} ; (iii) the probability that a nonparticipant attached becomes employed, as reported by Jones and Riddell (2019); and (iv) the average transition probability from probability from employment to unemployment, \bar{f}^{eu} .

To match a labor force participation rate of 66.8% and the 8% share of nonparticipant attached (Barnichon and Figura, 2016), we set the steady-state value of labor productivity \bar{y} and the real-wage scale parameter \bar{w} to 1.72 and 1.67, respectively.

Finally, the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks captures unobserved heterogeneity in home production (or leisure values), which is an inherently latent object. To proceed, we assume that the idiosyncratic component of home production x_t is log-normally distributed with parameters μ_x (scale) and σ_x (shape). We normalize $\mu_x = 0$, and we set $\sigma_x = 1$ so that the model replicates the elasticity of the transition probability from unemployment to employment with respect to labor productivity of 3.09.¹²

6 Quantification

In this section, we study the quantitative properties of the calibrated model. To achieve this goal, we solve the deterministic steady state, and we compute the model's dynamics in response to productivity shocks using an approximation of the model equilibrium conditions around the deterministic steady state that is accurate to the second order.¹³

Operationally, we perform 200 simulations, each 870 periods long. We simulate the model at a monthly frequency and then construct quarterly series by averaging the data over three consecutive non-overlapping periods. We discard 40% of the initial simulated series, so we are left with 420 observations that, once aggregated at the quarterly frequency, match the length of the sample period in Krusell et al. (2017). For each simulation, we compute moments and report the median of those moments across the 200 simulations.

¹²The lagged elasticity of the transition probability from unemployment to employment with respect to labor productivity, $\eta_{y_{-1}}^{f^{ue}}$, is estimated by running the regression $\log(f_t^{ue}) = \text{constant} + \eta_{y_{-1}}^{f^{ue}} \log(y_{t-1}) + u_t$ on actual and artificial data simulated from the model. Data on output per worker are from Hagedorn and Manovskii (2011).

¹³We numerically solve the model by relying on a second-order approximation to the solution around the deterministic steady state (see, e.g., Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2004).

	y	θ	υ	EPOP	ER	PR
A. Standard deviation						
Data Model: baseline Model: no link market-home productivity	0.0225 0.0225 0.0225	24.01 8.21 8.63	13.15 7.59 7.99	0.99 0.40 0.53	0.90 0.34 0.35	0.26 0.07 0.20
B. Correlation with output						
Data Model: baseline Model: no link market-home productivity	0.55 0.99 0.98	0.89 0.97 0.95	0.88 0.95 0.92	0.83 0.97 0.93	0.86 0.96 0.97	0.21 0.86 0.75
C. Autocorrelation						
Data Model: baseline Model: no link market-home productivity D. Beveridge curve	0.75 0.75 0.75	0.92 0.67 0.68	0.91 0.64 0.65	0.92 0.84 0.87	0.93 0.84 0.85	0.69 0.87 0.91
Data Model: baseline Model: no link market-home productivity	$-0.92 \\ -0.92 \\ -0.91$					

Table 3: Business Cycle Statistics – Labor Market Stocks

Notes: The variable *y* is labor productivity; θ is labor market tightness; *v* is vacancies; EPOP is the employment-to-population ratio; ER is the employment rate (one minus the unemployment rate); PR is the participation rate. Variables are quarterly averages of monthly series expressed in log-deviations from the Hodrick-Prescott trend with smoothing parameter 1,600. See Appendix A for data sources.

6.1 Standard Business Cycle Moments

We now turn to examining the time-series properties of the calibrated economy in terms of first- and second-order moments of labor market stocks and transition probabilities across the three states of the labor market in deviations from trend.

6.1.1 Labor Market Stocks

Table 3 reports business cycle statistics calculated on artificial data simulated from the model, aggregated to a quarterly frequency, logged, and Hodrick-Prescott (HP)-filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1,600. First, the model generates 40% of the volatility of the employment-to-population ratio and 27% of the volatility of the participation rate in the data. Note that by construction, the model matches the volatility of labor productivity in the data. Also, the model reproduces approximately 34% and 58% of the volatility of the tightness ratio and job vacancies, respectively, accounting for a nontrivial share of the

	f ^{eu}	f ^{en}	f ^{ue}	f ^{un}	f^{ne}	f ^{nu}
A. Average						
Data: AZ-adjusted Model: baseline Model: no link market-home productivity	$0.014 \\ 0.014 \\ 0.014$	$0.014 \\ 0.014 \\ 0.014$	0.228 0.230 0.228	0.135 0.015 0.015	0.022 0.013 0.013	0.021 0.015 0.015
B. Standard deviation						
Data: AZ-adjusted Data: De <i>NUN</i> ified Model: baseline Model: no link market-home productivity	0.089 0.069 0.011 0.012	0.083 0.036 0.002 0.007	0.088 0.076 0.036 0.038	0.106 0.066 0.002 0.008	0.103 0.041 0.027 0.030	0.072 0.063 0.013 0.007
C. Correlation with output						
Data: AZ-adjusted Data: De <i>NUN</i> ified Model: baseline Model: no link market-home productivity	-0.630 -0.660 -0.974 -0.950	0.430 0.290 0.929 -0.979	0.760 0.810 0.964 0.949	0.610 0.550 0.811 -0.961	0.520 0.570 0.826 0.825	-0.230 -0.560 -0.982 -0.943
D. Autocorrelation						
Data: AZ-adjusted Data: De <i>NUN</i> ified Model: baseline Model: no link market-home productivity	0.590 0.700 0.680 0.683	0.290 0.220 0.856 0.731	0.750 0.850 0.670 0.679	0.620 0.580 0.821 0.699	0.380 0.480 0.530 0.557	0.300 0.570 0.705 0.667

Table 4: Business Cycle Statistics - Transition Probabilities

Notes: The variable f^{ij} is the transition probability from labor market state *i* to *j*; *e* is employment; *u* is unemployment; n = 1 - e - u is nonparticipation; AZ is Abowd-Zellner. Variables are quarterly averages of monthly series expressed in log-deviations from the Hodrick-Prescott trend with smoothing parameter 1,600. See Appendix A for data sources.

fluctuations in what the model identifies as determinants of search frictions. Here we stress that as a number of shocks of varying nature and magnitude hit the U.S. economy over time, it is not surprising that a model with only productivity shocks like ours does not account for the entirety of the cyclical volatility in the data.¹⁴

In light of these considerations, we compare some of the model's predictions related to the elasticities of labor market stocks and workers' transition probabilities with respect to labor productivity with their empirical counterparts. In terms of labor market stocks, and focusing on Current Population Survey (CPS) data for the nonfarm business sector, we find that the contemporaneous and lagged estimated elasticities of the employment-

¹⁴Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) propose a similar argument in the context of the "unemployment volatility puzzle," in reference to the inability of the DMP model to reproduce the cyclical volatility in the U.S. unemployment rate.

to-population ratio to output per worker are 0.25 and 0.4, respectively. Running the same regressions on artificial data simulated from the model, we find elasticities of 0.35 that are remarkably close to the untargeted estimates in actual data. The model also does reasonably well in accounting for the elasticities of job vacancies, tightness, and the employment rate to labor productivity, all untargeted moments.¹⁵

The model also accounts for the co-movement and persistence in the data, measured as the contemporaneous correlation with output and autocorrelation, respectively. Note that none of these moments are a target of our calibration; thus, one can assess how well the model does against a rich set of overidentifying restrictions. The positive and strong co-movement of job vacancies with output is, to a large degree, not surprising. Intuitively, in the model, shocks to the output of a job are the only source of aggregate fluctuations, so job vacancies are bound to be highly correlated with output. In this sense, a close match with the data along that dimension cannot be viewed as a success. By contrast, the positive co-movement of the employment-to-population ratio is not hardwired into the model generates the strength of the comovement between the unemployment rate and output in the data, and it produces a correlation of the participation rate with output. We stress that even accounting for the *sign* of the co-movement of both unemployment and participation rates has been a challenge for equilibrium models of the aggregate labor market (see, e.g., Veracierto, 2008; Shimer, 2013).

The model does reasonably well in accounting for the persistence of job vacancies. In the model, job vacancies have an autocorrelation of 0.64, which is comparable with the 0.91 in the data. The lack of persistence in vacancies is a well-known problem in searchand-matching models of the labor market. As shown by Fujita and Ramey (2006), one way to tackle this shortcoming is to extend the model with sunk costs in vacancy posting. In our setting, though, the introduction of sunk costs in vacancy posting dramatically increases the state space of the model as the stocks of employed (attached and non-attached, separately), unemployed, and nonparticipants become endogenous state variables, thus enormously complicating the computation of the equilibrium.

Finally, the model generates a downward-sloping Beveridge curve—i.e., the negative empirical relationship between job vacancies and unemployment—which is a wellknown challenge for three-state models of the labor market (see, e.g., Tripier, 2004; Veracierto, 2008). Our results along this dimension are in line with Arseneau and Chugh

¹⁵Table C.1 in Appendix C reports the estimated elasticities for labor market stocks, tightness, and job vacancies in the model and in the data for several labor productivity series.

(2012).

6.1.2 Transition Probabilities

Table 4 shows averages and business cycle statistics for the transition probabilities across employment, unemployment, and nonparticipation in the model and data. We report statistics based on data adjusted for classification errors, as in Abowd and Zellner (1985), as well as "de*NUN*ified" data, as constructed in Elsby, Hobijn and Şahin (2015).

The model matches the calibration targets of the average transition probabilities from employment to unemployment ($\bar{f}^{eu} = 0.014$), from employment to nonparticipation ($\bar{f}^{en} = 0.014$), and from unemployment to employment ($\bar{f}^{ue} = 0.228$). As a by product then, the model matches the average probability of staying employed ($\bar{f}^{ee} = 1 - \bar{f}^{eu} - \bar{f}^{en} = 1 - 0.014 - 0.014 = 0.972$). Hence, in the model, as in the data, employment is a very persistent state. The model does reasonably well for other untargeted moments, too, such as the average probability from nonparticipation to employment ($\bar{f}^{ne} = 0.013$ in the model, compared with 0.022 in the data), and from nonparticipation to unemployment ($\bar{f}^{nu} = 0.015$ in the model, compared with 0.021 in the data).

Our calibrated model accounts well for the cyclical properties of the workers' transition probabilities across the three labor market states. Notably, it captures (i) the countercyclicality of the transition probabilities into unemployment (f^{eu}, f^{nu}) , (ii) the procyclicality of the transition probabilities out of unemployment (f^{ue} , f^{un}), and (iii) the procyclicality of the transition probability from nonparticipation to employment (f^{ne}). The model is successful in reproducing the *pro-cyclicality* of the transition probability from employment to nonparticipation (f^{en}) and that of the transition probability from unemployment to nonparticipation (f^{un}) , as in the data. This achievement is typically a challenge for three-state models of the labor market in which market productivity shocks are the only driving force of aggregate fluctuations. A positive productivity shock raises the match surplus across the board, so that individuals either continue working at a higher wage or continue seeking work at a higher expected value of future employment. Overall, these two forces induce countercyclical movements in both f^{en} and f^{un} . Indeed, a version of our model in which home productivity is not scaled by market productivity suffers from the same drawback, suggesting that the *pro*-cyclicality of the opportunity cost of employment is critical for the model to reproduce the pro-cyclicality of f^{en} and f^{un} .¹⁶

¹⁶Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016) find that the opportunity cost of employment is pro-

Finally, by virtue of our calibration strategy, the model matches the lagged elasticity of the probability of finding a job f^{ue} with respect to labor productivity, a key model object determining the extent of slack in the labor market. The model does reasonably well in terms of the elasticity of f^{ne} to labor productivity, and it reproduces the negative sign of the estimated elasticities of f^{en} and f^{un} ; however, it greatly undershoots the strong countercyclicality of the transition probability from employment to unemployment, f^{eu} .¹⁷

6.2 Cyclical Skewness

We now turn to evaluating the model's ability to generate the cyclical asymmetry in the data, as measured by the skewness of a time series in deviations from trend, or "deepness" (Sichel, 1993). Note that, since the skewness is not a target of our calibration, a close match to the data constitutes an additional validation of the model.

Table 5 reports skewness statistics for three different filtering or detrending methods: HP, Baxter-King (BK), and Christiano-Fitzgerald (CF) filters. Overall, the model is successful in reproducing the deepness in the employment-to-population ratio in the data and, crucially, the negative skewness in the employment rate and the lack of it in the labor force participation rate.

Focusing on the results based on the HP filter to streamline exposition, we find that the skewness in the artificial employment-to-population ratio generated by the model is -0.24, which is 75% of the skewness in the data. The model reproduces the disconnect between the asymmetry properties of unemployment and participation rates as well. In the model, cyclical fluctuations in the employment rate (one minus the unemployment rate) are left skewed, with a skewness coefficient of -0.25, whereas those in the participation rate are symmetric, with a skewness coefficient of virtually zero. Similar results hold for the BK and CF filter.

6.3 Impulse Response Functions

To illustrate the propagation mechanism of productivity shocks embodied in the model, in this section, we discuss impulse response functions (IRFs). All responses are expressed as log deviations from the deterministic steady-state levels.

cyclical and volatile over the business cycle.

¹⁷Table C.2 in Appendix C reports the estimated elasticities for the transition probabilities in the model and in the data for several labor productivity series.

	EPOP	ER	PR
A. Hodrick-Prescott filter			
Data Model: baseline		$-0.70 \\ -0.25$	
B. Baxter-King filter			
Data Model: baseline		$-0.85 \\ -0.27$	0.07
C. Christiano-Fitzgerald filter			
Data Model: baseline	-	$-0.51 \\ -0.14$	

Table 5: Skewness of Labor Market Stocks

Notes: EPOP is the employment-to-population ratio; ER is one minus the unemployment rate; PR is the participation rate. Variables are quarterly averages of monthly series expressed in log-deviations from trend. The smoothing parameter for the Hodrick-Prescott filter is 1,600. For the Baxter-King and Christiano-Fitzgerald filters, we consider frequencies between 2 and 32 quarters. The moving-average order for Baxter-King is set to 8 quarters. See Appendix A for data sources.

IRFs: Search and separation cutoffs. An important part of the propagation mechanism of shocks embodied in the model is how labor force participation varies over the business cycle. In the model, the participation margin of employment adjustment is described by the response of the search and separation cutoffs to shocks and the mass of individuals at those cutoffs.

After a positive productivity shock, labor supply is affected by two contrasting forces. On the one hand, high *market* productivity results in higher wages, increasing, ceteris paribus, the return of nonparticipant individuals to the labor force. Similarly, an individual may postpone the separation decision and stay in the labor force. In short, individuals with higher home productivity are led into the labor force. On the other hand, higher *home* productivity increases the opportunity cost of market work, prompting nonparticipants to stay out of the labor force or employed individuals to drop out of it. Which of these two forces prevails depends on the parametrization of the model.

The IRFs in Figure 2 show that in the baseline model, in which home productivity is scaled by market productivity, the search (x^v) and separation (x^q) cutoffs fall in response to a technology shock that increases home and market productivity. By contrast, in the

case of a "pure" market productivity shock, in which home productivity is *not* scaled by market productivity, the cutoffs x^v and x^q move in opposite directions, which in turn makes the workers' transition probabilities f^{en} and f^{un} fall in response to a positive technology shock (see Figure C.1 in Appendix C). By assumption, home productivity is proportional to market productivity, implying that the opportunity cost of employment is pro-cyclical, consistent with the evidence in Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016). As it turns out, the pro-cyclicality of the opportunity cost of employment is critical for the model to replicate the pro-cyclicality of f^{en} and f^{un} in the data.





Figure 2: The figure shows the impulse response function of the search (x^v) and separation (x^q) cutoffs to a productivity shock in the baseline model (solid line) and in a version of the model in which home productivity is not scaled by market productivity (dash-dotted line). All responses are expressed as log deviations from the deterministic steady-state levels. See Section 5 for details on the parametrization of the model.

IRFs: Labor market stocks and transition probabilities. Figures 3 and 4 show the IRFs of labor market stocks and workers' transition probabilities, respectively. Note that by assumption, the productivity shock follows an AR(1) process so that its IRF features a jump on impact and monotonic reversion toward the unconditional mean. In response to



a positive productivity shock, labor market stocks exhibit hump-shaped dynamics.

Figure 3: The figure shows the impulse response function to a productivity shock. EPOP is the employment-to-population ratio; ER is the employment rate (one minus the unemployment rate); PR is the participation rate. $\Omega = \frac{u + \phi n^a}{u + \phi n}$ is the fraction of job seekers that accepts a job offer. All responses are expressed as log deviations from the deterministic steady-state levels. See Section 5 for details on the parametrization of the model.

Job vacancies and the market tightness ratio (θ) rise on impact and then revert back to their steady-state values, mirroring the dynamics of the productivity shock. The fraction of job seekers accepting a job offer (Ω) instead displays hump-shaped dynamics; it falls in response to a productivity shock, slowly reverting to its steady-state level.

6.4 Role of Labor Supply and Search Frictions

To gain further insight into the mechanism of fluctuations, we carry out a quantitative accounting exercise that leverages the structure of the model.

Labor supply versus slackness channel. To assess the importance of labor supply decisions vis-à-vis slack, we simulate two counterfactual economies in which, crucially, we keep the same parameter values and the same realizations of productivity shocks as in the




Figure 4: The figure shows the impulse response function of the workers' transition probabilities to a productivity shock. All responses are expressed as log deviations from the deterministic steady-state levels. See Section 5 for details on the parametrization of the model.

baseline economy. In the first counterfactual ("Ctrfl 1"), we re-solve the model by dropping the free-entry condition (5) and fix the market tightness ratio at its steady-state value in the baseline economy; separation and search cutoffs are allowed to vary in response to shocks as implied by the separation and search indifference conditions (6) and (7). This exercise produces counterfactual time series of labor market stocks and flows in which all the variation comes from the response of the two cutoffs to productivity shocks—namely, the "labor supply channel."

Conversely, in the second counterfactual ("Ctrfl 2"), we re-solve the model by dropping the indifference conditions for separation and search and fix the values of the two cutoffs at their steady-state values in the baseline economy; the tightness ratio is allowed instead to vary as implied by the free-entry condition (5). This counterfactual isolates the role of fluctuations in the tightness ratio—namely, the "slackness channel."¹⁸

We stress that this exercise is neither a test of whether a two-state model is a better abstraction than a three-state model nor a way to discriminate between frictional and frictionless models of the labor market. The constructed counterfactual series for the unemployment rate and the participation rate are not the equilibrium outcome of nested economies. Specifically, fixing the cutoffs on home productivity at their steady-state values does not render a two-state model of the labor market. The counterfactual economy with fixed cutoffs continues to display flows in and out of the labor force. In addition, the transition probabilities from out of the labor force to either employment or unemployment, and the transition probability from unemployment to attached nonparticipation directly depend on the tightness ratio. Thus, movements in market tightness alone drive fluctuations not only in the flows between employment and unemployment, but also in those in and out of the labor force.¹⁹

Similarly, fixing the market tightness ratio at its steady-state value does not render a frictionless economy. The reason is that while the extent of frictions is not allowed to vary in response to shocks, the counterfactual economy with fixed tightness continues to display unemployment and fluctuations in the unemployment rate.²⁰

¹⁸For each counterfactual, we recompute the equilibrium of the model by relying on a second-order approximation to the solution around the deterministic steady state.

¹⁹Tables C.3 and C.4 in Appendix C report results for two additional experiments, in which we fix one cutoff at a time.

²⁰We note that since the model is nonlinear, the results of our quantitative accounting exercise are to be viewed as theory-based counterfactuals, as opposed to results of a linear additive decomposition.

	Model	Ctrfl 1 (fixed tightness)	Ctrfl 2 (fixed cutoffs)
A. Standard deviation			
Employment-to-population ratio	0.40	0.06	0.43
Employment rate	0.34	0.01	0.35
Participation rate	0.07	0.07	0.09
B. Correlation with output			
Employment-to-population ratio	0.97	-0.24	0.96
Employment rate	0.96	0.90	0.97
Participation rate	0.86	-0.37	0.91
C. Skewness			
Employment-to-population ratio	-0.24	-0.05	-0.24
Employment rate	-0.25	0.04	-0.25
Participation rate	-0.07	-0.05	-0.18

Table 6: Labor Supply versus Slackness

Notes: "Ctrfl 1" refers to the counterfactual experiment where the model is simulated with the tightness ratio fixed at its steady-state value and varying search and separation cutoffs. "Ctrfl 2" refers to the counterfactual experiment where the model is simulated with cutoffs fixed at their steady-state values and a varying tightness ratio. In all counterfactuals, we keep the same realizations of productivity shocks.

Cyclical volatility and co-movement. Panels A and B of Table 6 show the results of the two experiments for the cyclical volatility and co-movement of the labor market stocks with output. First, through the lens of the model, absent the response of the search and separation cutoffs to productivity shocks, fluctuations in the market tightness ratio account for the bulk of the cyclical volatility in the unemployment rate and are an important driver of the fluctuations in the participation rate, too.

Second, the counterfactual with a fixed tightness ratio yields the *wrong* co-movement between the participation rate and output, which is positive in the data and in the baseline economy but negative in the counterfactual. That is, in the counterfactual economy with fixed tightness, during a recession the labor force participation rate rises, instead of falling as in the data, which highlights the critical role of the fluctuations in the probability of

finding a job for the cyclicality of the participation rate.²¹

Cyclical skewness (deepness). Panel C of Table 6 shows results for deepness, again measured as skewness of a variable in deviation from trend. First, the slackness channel, captured by endogenous fluctuations in the market tightness ratio, accounts for virtually all the negative skewness in the employment rate. The participation margin per se does not generate skewness. In fact, fluctuations in the cutoffs alone would generate symmetric fluctuations in the unemployment rate, which is strongly at odds with the data.

Second, the lack of skewness in the participation rate is the result of competing forces. Fluctuations in the tightness ratio alone generate negative skewness in the participation rate, while the labor supply channel counteracts that effect. Capturing the relative strength of these two channels is key for the model to replicate the observed disconnect between the asymmetry properties of unemployment and participation rates in the data.

7 Conclusion

In the United States cyclical fluctuations in the employment-to-population ratio exhibit "deepness," which refers to the pattern that the deviations below the trend (troughs) are larger than those above (peaks). This phenomenon produces negative skewness in the distribution of the employment-to-population ratio in deviations from the trend.

Our analysis starts with documenting a related, yet overlooked fact: deepness in the employment-to-population ratio is accounted for solely by the unemployment rate in that fluctuations in the labor force participation rate are symmetric. To explain these facts, we formulate a business cycle model featuring frictional unemployment and a labor force participation decision. The model, restricted to fit key observations of U.S. data, accounts for the observed cyclical skewness in the unemployment rate and the lack thereof in the participation rate, as well as salient properties of gross worker flows across employment, unemployment, and nonparticipation.

Through the lens of a host of quantitative experiments, we find that cyclical fluctuations in the extent of search frictions, as measured by the speed at which job seekers find job opportunities, account for the deepness of the employment-to-population ratio. Individuals' participation decisions contribute by affecting the size and the composition

²¹Panels B and C of Table C.4 in Appendix C report the standard deviations and the correlation with output of the workers' transition probabilities across counterfactual experiments.

of the pool of job seekers competing for jobs, which in turn affect the tightness ratio and, thereby, the amount of slack in the labor market. Absent labor supply responses to cyclical shocks, the labor force participation rate would display asymmetric fluctuations at odds with U.S. data, mirroring the asymmetry in the probability of finding a job.

Altogether, this paper provides a parsimonious model that combines the traditional view that business cycles are symmetric ups and downs around the trend at the core of frictionless RBC models with the alternative view that nonlinearities from frictions in the labor market generate cyclical asymmetries and significant higher-order moments, often neglected in business cycle research. The analysis has important implications for economic policy. For example, a question that has received renewed interest in recent years from practitioners and policymakers pertains to the effects of fiscal policy in recessions. Early theoretical work on this topic has abstracted from the participation margin (see, e.g., Ferraro and Fiori, 2021; Ghassibe and Zanetti, 2020; Michaillat, 2014). A natural next step would then seem to be to explicitly consider labor supply decisions along the lines of this paper to study how fiscal policy affects gross worker flows in and out of the labor force and quantify the extent to which these flows affect the aggregate unemployment rate in recessions.

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Appendix

A Data Sources

Data for the monthly and seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate (series LNS1400000) and participation rate (series LNS11300000) are from the Current Population Survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and available on the BLS website at www.bls.gov. The employment-to-population ratio is obtained as one minus the unemployment rate times the participation rate. Data for monthly hazard rates across different states (employment, unemployment, and nonparticipation) are taken from Krusell et al. (2017). Data for job vacancies are the monthly composite Help-Wanted Index (HWI) constructed by Barnichon (2010) and available on the author's website at https://sites.google.com/site/regisbarnichon. Quarterly data are obtained by averaging non-overlapping monthly observations in a given quarter. Seasonally adjusted quarterly data for real output per worker in the nonfarm business sector are produced by the BLS and available on the Labor Productivity and Costs home page at http://www.bls.gov/lpc.

B Derivations

We use f_t^{ij} to denote the worker's transition probability from labor market state *i* to *j* at time *t*, and the labels "*a*" and "*na*" to indicate "attached" and "non-attached" individuals, respectively.

The stocks of employment (e), unemployment (u), and nonparticipation (n) evolve over time according to

$$e_{t+1}^{a} = f_{t+1}^{e_{a}e_{a}}e_{t}^{a} + f_{t+1}^{e_{na}e_{a}}e_{t}^{na} + f_{t+1}^{ue_{a}}u_{t} + f_{t+1}^{n_{a}e_{a}}n_{t}^{a} + f_{t+1}^{n_{na}e_{a}}n_{t}^{na};$$
(B.1)

$$e_{t+1}^{na} = f_{t+1}^{e_a e_{na}} e_t^a + f_{t+1}^{e_{na} e_{na}} e_t^{na} + f_{t+1}^{ue_{na}} u_t + f_{t+1}^{n_a e_{na}} n_t^a + f_{t+1}^{n_{na} e_{na}} n_t^{na};$$
(B.2)

$$u_{t+1} = f_{t+1}^{e_a u} e_t^a + f_{t+1}^{e_{na} u} e_t^{na} + f_{t+1}^{u u} u_t + f_{t+1}^{n_a u} n_t^a + f_{t+1}^{n_{na} u} n_t^{na};$$
(B.3)

$$n_{t+1}^{a} = f_{t+1}^{e_{a}n_{m}} e_{t}^{a} + f_{t+1}^{e_{na}n_{a}} e_{t}^{na} + f_{t+1}^{u_{n}} u_{t} + f_{t+1}^{n_{a}n_{a}} n_{t}^{a} + f_{t+1}^{n_{na}n_{a}} n_{t}^{na};$$
(B.4)

$$n_{t+1}^{na} = f_{t+1}^{e_a n_n} e_t^a + f_{t+1}^{e_{na} n_{na}} e_t^{na} + f_{t+1}^{u n_{na}} u_t + f_{t+1}^{n_a n_{na}} n_t^a + f_{t+1}^{n_{na} n_{na}} n_t^{na}.$$
(B.5)

The workers' transition probabilities are calculated as:

$$f_{t+1}^{e_a e_a} = (1 - \delta) \left\{ 1 - \lambda \left[1 - F \left(x_{t+1}^v \right) \right] \right\} + \delta \left\{ 1 - \lambda \left[1 - F \left(x_{t+1}^v \right) \right] \right\} p_{t+1}; \tag{B.6}$$

$$f_{t+1}^{e_{na}e_a} = (1-\delta)\lambda F\left(x_{t+1}^{v}\right) + \delta\lambda F\left(x_{t+1}^{v}\right) p_{t+1};\tag{B.7}$$

$$f_{t+1}^{ue_a} = p_{t+1} \left\{ 1 - \lambda \left[1 - F \left(x_{t+1}^v \right) \right] \right\};$$
(B.8)

$$f_{t+1}^{n_a e_a} = p_{t+1} \lambda F\left(x_{t+1}^{v}\right); \tag{B.9}$$

$$f_{t+1}^{n_{na}e_a} = p_{t+1}\lambda F\left(x_{t+1}^{v}\right); \tag{B.10}$$

$$f_{t+1}^{e_{a}e_{na}} = (1-\delta)\,\lambda[F\left(x_{t+1}^{q}\right) - F\left(x_{t+1}^{v}\right)] + \delta\lambda[F\left(x_{t+1}^{q}\right) - F\left(x_{t+1}^{v}\right)]\phi p_{t+1}; \tag{B.11}$$

$$f_{t+1}^{e_{na}e_{na}} = (1-\delta) \left\{ 1 - \lambda F\left(x_{t+1}^{\upsilon}\right) - \lambda \left[1 - F\left(x_{t+1}^{\eta}\right) \right] \right\}$$

$$(B.12)$$

$$+ \delta \left\{ 1 - \lambda F\left(x_{t+1}^{\upsilon}\right) - \lambda \left[1 - F\left(x_{t+1}^{\eta}\right) \right] \right\}$$

$$(B.12)$$

$$+ o \left\{ 1 - \lambda r \left(x_{t+1} \right) - \lambda \left[1 - r \left(x_{t+1} \right) \right] \right\} \psi \rho_{t+1}, \tag{B.13}$$

$$f_{t+1}^{ue_{na}} = \phi p_{t+1} \lambda \left[F\left(x_{t+1}^{q}\right) - F\left(x_{t+1}^{v}\right) \right]; \tag{B.14}$$

$$f_{t+1}^{n_{a}e_{na}} = \phi p_{t+1} \left\{ 1 - \lambda \left[1 - F \left(x_{t+1}^{q} \right) \right] - \lambda F \left(x_{t+1}^{v} \right) \right\};$$

$$f_{t+1}^{n_{na}e_{na}} = \phi p_{t+1} \lambda \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^{q} \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^{v} \right) \right];$$
(B.15)
(B.16)

$$f_{t+1}^{\text{marking}} = \phi p_{t+1} \lambda \left[F(x_{t+1}) - F(x_{t+1}) \right]; \tag{B.16}$$

$$f_{t+1}^{e_a u} = \delta \left\{ 1 - \lambda \left[1 - F \left(x_{t+1}^v \right) \right] \right\} (1 - p_{t+1}); \tag{B.17}$$

$$f_{t+1}^{e_{nau}} = \delta \lambda F(x_{t+1}^{o}) (1 - p_{t+1}); \tag{B.18}$$

$$f_{t+1}^{uu} = (1 - p_{t+1}) \left\{ 1 - \lambda \left[1 - F \left(x_{t+1}^v \right) \right] \right\};$$
(B.19)
$$f_{t+1}^{uu} = (1 - p_{t+1}) \left\{ 1 - \lambda \left[1 - F \left(x_{t+1}^v \right) \right] \right\};$$
(B.20)

$$f_{t+1}^{n_a u} = (1 - p_{t+1})\lambda F\left(x_{t+1}^v\right); \tag{B.20}$$

$$f_{t+1}^{n_{na}u} = (1 - p_{t+1})\lambda F\left(x_{t+1}^{\upsilon}\right); \tag{B.21}$$

$$f_{t+1}^{e_a n_a} = \delta \lambda \left[F\left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F\left(x_{t+1}^v \right) \right] (1 - \phi p_{t+1}); \tag{B.22}$$

$$f_{t+1}^{e_m n_a} = \delta \left\{ 1 - \lambda F \left(x_{t+1}^v \right) - \lambda \left[1 - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \right\} (1 - \phi p_{t+1}); \tag{B.23}$$

$$f_{t+1}^{u n_a} = (1 - \phi n_{t+1}) \lambda \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right] \cdot \left[F \left($$

$$f_{t+1}^{maa} = (1 - \phi p_{t+1})\lambda \left[F(x_{t+1}^{*}) - F(x_{t+1}^{*})\right]; \tag{B.24}$$

$$f_{t+1}^{n_{a}n_{a}} = (1 - \phi p_{t+1}) \left\{ 1 - \lambda F(x_{t+1}^{v}) - \lambda \left[1 - F(x_{t+1}^{q}) \right] \right\};$$
(B.25)

$$f_{t+1}^{n_{ma}n_{a}} = (1 - \phi p_{t})\lambda \left[F(x_{t+1}^{\eta}) - F(x_{t+1}^{\upsilon}) \right];$$
(B.26)

$$f_{t+1}^{e_a n_{na}} = \lambda \left[1 - F \left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right]; \tag{B.27}$$

$$f_{t+1}^{e_{na}n_{na}} = \lambda \left[1 - F \left(x_{t+1}^{q} \right) \right]; \tag{B.28}$$

$$f_{t+1}^{un_{na}} = \lambda \left[1 - F \left(x_{t+1}^{q} \right) \right]; \tag{B.29}$$

$$f_{t+1}^{n_a n_{aa}} = \lambda \left[1 - F\left(x_{t+1}^q \right) \right]; \tag{B.30}$$

$$f_{t+1}^{n_{na}n_{na}} = 1 - \lambda F\left(x_{t+1}^{q}\right). \tag{B.31}$$

C Additional Results

1	θ	υ	EPOP	ER	PR
A. Data, contemporaneous					
η_y^l : CPS, non-farm business η_y^l : CPS, all private η_y^l : LPC, non-farm business η_y^l : LPC, all private	4.949 6.501 2.597 4.244	5.171 6.923 2.910 4.723	0.251 0.281 0.035 0.112	0.171 0.214 0.054 0.108	-0.016 -0.052 -0.050 -0.057
B. Data, lagged					
$\eta_{y_{-1}}^{l}$: CPS, non-farm business $\eta_{y_{-1}}^{l}$: CPS, all private $\eta_{y_{-1}}^{l}$: LPC, non-farm business $\eta_{y_{-1}}^{l}$: LPC, all private	6.204 8.349 4.570 6.484	6.427 8.769 4.873 6.942	0.396 0.488 0.223 0.330	0.244 0.315 0.159 0.225	0.012 -0.005 -0.027 -0.025
C. Model, contemporaneous					
η^l_y : baseline η^l_y : no link market-home productivity	7.506 8.244	6.812 7.181	0.350 0.674	0.342 0.375	0.008 0.301
D. Model, lagged					
$\eta_{y_{-1}}^l$: baseline $\eta_{y_{-1}}^l$: no link market-home productivity	7.114 7.855	6.405 6.765	0.352 0.686	0.345 0.379	0.007 0.309

Table C.1: Elasticity of Labor Market Stocks to Labor Productivity

Notes: The variables η_y^l and $\eta_{y_{-1}}^l$ denote the elasticity of $l \in \{\theta, v, \text{EPOP}, \text{ER}, \text{PR}\}$ to contemporaneous (y) and lagged (y_{-1}) output per worker, respectively. CPS is Current Population Survey; LPC is Labor Productivity and Costs. Contemporaneous and lagged elasticities are estimated by running the regressions $\log(l_t) = \text{constant} + \eta_y^l \log(y_t) + u_t$ and $\log(l_t) = \text{constant} + \eta_{y_{-1}}^l \log(y_{t-1}) + u_t$ on actual and artificial data simulated from the model. Data on output per worker are from Hagedorn and Manovskii (2011).

1	f ^{eu}	f ^{en}	f ^{ue}	f ^{un}	f^{ne}	f^{nu}
A. Data, contemporaneous						
η_{y}^{l} : CPS, non-farm business	-4.005	2.032	2.144	2.626	2.891	-0.394
η_{y}^{i} : CPS, all private	-5.749	2.683	2.432	4.039	3.918	0.130
η_{y}^{j} : LPC, non-farm business	-3.632	0.685	0.191	1.259	1.725	0.389
η_{y}^{i} : LPC, all private	-5.128	1.324	0.735	2.383	2.813	0.762
B. Data, lagged						
$\eta_{y_{-1}}^l$: CPS, non-farm business	-3.639	2.716	3.093	3.853	3.751	-0.272
$\eta_{y_{-1}}^{j_{-1}}$: CPS, all private	-4.843	3.768	4.273	5.269	5.741	0.166
$\eta_{y_{-1}}^{j}$: LPC, non-farm business	-3.444	2.042	1.548	2.904	2.834	0.177
$\eta_{y_{-1}}^{j}$: LPC, all private	-4.289	3.149	2.444	4.234	4.339	0.486
C. Model, contemporaneous						
η_y^l : baseline	-1.115	0.219	3.257	0.164	1.804	-1.273
η_{ν}^{j} : no link market-home productivity	-1.113		3.604	-0.790	2.334	-0.653
D. Model, lagged						
$\eta_{y_{-1}}^l$: baseline	-1.062	0.220	3.086	0.171	1.603	-1.219
$\eta_{y_{-1}}^{j_{-1}}$: no link market-home productivity	-1.059	-0.740	3.434	-0.756	2.126	-0.620
$\eta_{y_{-1}}^{i}$: no link market-home productivity Notes: The variables n_{-1}^{l} and n_{-1}^{l} denote the ela						

Table C.2: Elasticity of Transition Probabilities to Labor Productivity

Notes: The variables η_y^l and $\eta_{y_{-1}}^l$ denote the elasticity of $l \in \{f^{eu}, f^{en}, f^{ue}, f^{un}, f^{ne}, f^{nu}\}$ to contemporaneous (y) and lagged (y_{-1}) output per worker, respectively. CPS is Current Population Survey; LPC is Labor Productivity and Costs. Contemporaneous and lagged elasticities are estimated by running the regressions $\log(l_t) = \text{constant} + \eta_y^l \log(y_t) + u_t$ and $\log(l_t) = \text{constant} + \eta_{y_{-1}}^l \log(y_{t-1}) + u_t$ on actual and artificial data simulated from the model. Data on output per worker are from Hagedorn and Manovskii (2011).




Figure C.1: The figure shows the impulse response function of the workers' transition probabilities to a productivity shock in a version of the model in which home productivity is not scaled by market productivity. All responses are expressed as log deviations from the deterministic steady-state levels. See Section 5 for details on the parametrization of the model.

	y	θ	υ	EPOP	ER	PR
A. Standard deviation						
Data	0.0225	24.01	13.15	0.99	0.90	0.26
Model: baseline	0.0225	8.21	7.59	0.99	0.34	0.20
Ctrfl: θ fixed	0.0225	0.00	0.00	0.40	0.01	0.07
Ctrfl: x^{v} and x^{q} cutoffs fixed	0.0225	8.33	7.71	0.00	0.35	0.09
Ctrfl: x^{v} cutoff fixed	0.0225	8.24	7.63	0.41	0.34	0.07
Ctrfl: x^q cutoff fixed	0.0225	8.32	7.69	0.43	0.35	0.08
B. Correlation with output Data Model: baseline Ctrfl: θ fixed Ctrfl: x^v and x^q cutoffs fixed	0.55 0.99 1.00 0.99	0.89 0.97 0.95 0.96	0.88 0.95 0.72 0.94	0.83 0.97 -0.24 0.96	0.86 0.96 0.90 0.97	0.21 0.86 -0.37 0.91
Ctrfl: x^{v} cutoff fixed	0.99	0.96	0.95	0.90	0.97	0.92
Ctrfl: x^q cutoff fixed	0.99	0.96	0.94	0.96	0.97	0.93
C. Autocorrelation						
Data	0.75	0.92	0.91	0.92	0.93	0.69
Model: baseline	0.75	0.67	0.64	0.84	0.84	0.87
Ctrfl: θ fixed	0.75	0.75	0.43	0.94	0.86	0.93
Ctrfl: x^v and x^q cutoffs fixed	0.75	0.67	0.64	0.85	0.84	0.88
Ctrfl: x^{v} cutoff fixed	0.75	0.67	0.64	0.84	0.84	0.87
Ctrfl: x^q cutoff fixed	0.75	0.67	0.64	0.85	0.84	0.87

Table C.3: Business Cycle Statistics – Labor Market Stocks

Notes: The variable *y* is labor productivity; θ is labor market tightness; *v* is vacancies; EPOP is the employment-to-population ratio; ER is the employment rate (one minus the unemployment rate); PR is the participation rate. Variables are quarterly averages of monthly series expressed in log-deviations from the Hodrick-Prescott trend with smoothing parameter 1,600. See Appendix A for data sources.

	f ^{eu}	f ^{en}	f ^{ue}	f ^{un}	f ^{ne}	f ^{nu}
	J	J	J	J	J	J
A. Average						
Data: AZ-adjusted Model: baseline Ctrfl: θ fixed Ctrfl: x^v and x^q cutoffs fixed Ctrfl: x^v cutoff fixed Ctrfl: x^q cutoff fixed	$\begin{array}{c} 0.014 \\ 0.014 \\ 0.014 \\ 0.014 \\ 0.014 \\ 0.014 \\ 0.014 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.014 \\ 0.014 \\ 0.014 \\ 0.014 \\ 0.014 \\ 0.014 \end{array}$	0.228 0.230 0.228 0.229 0.229 0.229	0.135 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015	0.022 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.013	$\begin{array}{c} 0.021 \\ 0.015 \\ 0.015 \\ 0.015 \\ 0.015 \\ 0.015 \\ 0.015 \end{array}$
B. Standard deviation						
Data: AZ-adjusted Data: De <i>NUN</i> ified Model: baseline Ctrfl: θ fixed Ctrfl: x^v and x^q cutoffs fixed Ctrfl: x^v cutoff fixed Ctrfl: x^q cutoff fixed	0.089 0.069 0.011 0.001 0.012 0.011 0.012	0.083 0.036 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001	0.088 0.076 0.036 0.000 0.036 0.036 0.036	0.106 0.066 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.002	0.103 0.041 0.027 0.002 0.028 0.027 0.028	0.072 0.063 0.013 0.004 0.012 0.011 0.014
C. Correlation with output						
Data: AZ-adjusted Data: De <i>NUN</i> ified Model: baseline Ctrfl: θ fixed Ctrfl: x^v and x^q cutoffs fixed Ctrfl: x^v cutoff fixed Ctrfl: x^q cutoff fixed	$\begin{array}{c} -0.630 \\ -0.660 \\ -0.974 \\ -0.362 \\ 0.682 \\ 0.676 \\ -0.976 \end{array}$	0.430 0.290 0.929 0.939 0.601 0.836 -0.518	$\begin{array}{c} 0.760\\ 0.810\\ 0.964\\ -0.998\\ 0.673\\ 0.671\\ 0.961\\ \end{array}$	0.610 0.550 0.811 0.998 0.674 0.653 0.796	0.520 0.570 0.826 0.097 0.544 0.531 0.861	$\begin{array}{c} -0.230 \\ -0.560 \\ -0.982 \\ -0.998 \\ 0.674 \\ 0.672 \\ -0.979 \end{array}$
D. Autocorrelation						
Data: AZ-adjusted Data: De <i>NUN</i> ified Model: baseline Ctrfl: θ fixed Ctrfl: x^v and x^q cutoffs fixed Ctrfl: x^v cutoff fixed Ctrfl: x^q cutoff fixed	0.590 0.700 0.680 0.936 0.682 0.676 0.688	0.290 0.220 0.856 0.792 0.601 0.836 0.718	0.750 0.850 0.670 0.747 0.673 0.671 0.672	0.620 0.580 0.821 0.747 0.674 0.653 0.807	0.380 0.480 0.530 0.879 0.544 0.531 0.550	0.300 0.570 0.705 0.747 0.674 0.672 0.707

Table C.4: Business Cycle Statistics – Transition Probabilities

Notes: The variable f^{ij} is the transition probability from labor market state *i* to *j*; *e* is employment; *u* is unemployment; n = 1 - e - u is nonparticipation; AZ is Abowd-Zellner. Variables are quarterly averages of monthly series expressed in log-deviations from the Hodrick-Prescott trend with smoothing parameter 1,600. See Appendix A for data sources.